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国際理解科目 **Japan's Modern Image**

Week 3
Our Gallant Ally

- 1904-5: Plucking Britain's chestnuts out of the fire
- 1915: Payback time: The Twenty-One Demands
- 1921: Washington and the end of the Alliance


Reading 1: The Russo-Japanese War



THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE OF 1902 was to some extent the creation of the mass media, in particular two journalists on *The Times*: Valentine Chirol and G.E. Morrison. Morrison not only did everything he could to bring Japan and Britain together, he pulled every string in his considerable diplomatic and media network to encourage war between Japan and Russia. In attacking her rival in East Asia, Japan more than fulfilled the short-term promise of the Alliance.

Defeating Russia removed Britain's chestnuts from the fire at no cost to Britain, or so it was thought at the time.

FOR JAPAN, victory against Russia took Japan much closer to her dream of an internationally recognised sphere of interest in Manchuria. It may also have given rise to an impression in Tokyo of British weakness, or of power overstretched, that would later become an undeniable reality. Either way, by the victory over China of 1895, by the Alliance in 1902, by the victory of 1904-5, and by the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan became recognised as a world power and, after Britain, the *de facto* dominant power in East Asia.




Reading 2: The Twenty-One Demands

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS were first presented to China's Republican ruler, Yüan Shih-k'ai, in January 1915, by Hioki Masu, Japan's minister to Peking, who enjoined Yüan to secrecy. When news though not the full extent of the Demands leaked out, the Kokusai agency presented the world with a considerably watered-down version, which was accepted by *The Times* correspondents in Tokyo (Penlington) and Peking, David Fraser. This misrepresentation might have escaped scrutiny had it not been for the efforts of G. E. Morrison and W. H. Donald, two Australian ex-journalists, who had become paid advisers of China. Working in Yüan Shih-k'ai's administration, Morrison soon gained access to the full version of the Demands, which he conveyed to Donald.

Donald sent a long message to *The Times*, which was published in a Leader, though with a disclaimer, and directly to Wickham Steed, editor of *The Times*. Morrison also did his best to alter his successor David Fraser's view of the Demands. In Beijing, both the *Peking Gazette* and the *Peking Daily News* discussed the Demands and energetically opposed them and queried the judgement of *The Times* in appearing to take the Japanese side. Meanwhile in Japan, then and later, the *Japan Chronicle* campaigned against the Demands and tracked the efforts of the Kokusai Tsūshinsha [国際津新車] to suppress news of their true nature.

In China and in Japan, much of the opposition of the English-language newspapers and of many Chinese-language newspapers to the Twenty-One Demands was inspired by Morrison's campaign against them in Peking. Before long, the British press had caught up with its East Asian contemporaries and raised a considerable and almost unanimous outcry against the Demands. His campaign was for Morrison a turning point in his view of Japan, whose policies in China he had hitherto viewed in an understanding light, seeing Germany as Britain's real enemy there.




Morrison now felt that 'Japanese militarism is the counterpart of German militarism' and maintained that Japan's policy in China was predicated on a belief in German invincibility in arms and the defeat of Great Britain in the current war.¹ Following the campaign of 1915, Morrison and W. H. Donald became targets of Japanese publicity.

The effect of Kokusai's omissions and misstatements, exemplified by their treatment of news about the Twenty-One Demands, was in the short term to fog and confuse foreign perceptions of Japan's role in these incidents. In the longer term, the international credibility of news from Japan in general and of Kokusai in particular was weakened, and this loss of credibility overshadowed Kokusai's existence until its demise in 1926.

¹ G. E. Morrison to C. Clementi Smith, 26 May 1915 in Lo Hui-Min (1976), pp.406-407.

Reading 3: Washington and the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance



ON DECEMBER 8 1920, ill-feeling accumulated over Japan's seizure of the German colonies, her administration in Korea, the 21 Demands and incidents such as the Shaw affair surfaced in a Foreign Office Memorandum by Frank Ashton-Gwatkin surveying the recent history of Korea and citing accounts of Japanese cruelty in her other colonies given in the English-language newspapers of East Asia.

"In commenting on the ruthless record of Japanese colonisation, it is

unfair to draw too strict a parallel with the supposed canons of occidental nations. In the first place, as already pointed out, the idea of justice is simply non-existent; and so to a considerable extent is the idea of individual responsibility. For a whole village to be burned as punishment for the crime of one of its inhabitants is to the Oriental a natural vindication of outraged authority; for it is the community and not the individual which is the responsible unit. But it is these very excuses for the Japanese which call attention to the wide discrepancy between their ideals and our own, and to the doubtful wisdom of our lending the prestige of our good name to an ally whose way of thinking and acting is so essentially different from ours. Already, history regards Great Britain and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as largely responsible for the handing over of Korea to Japan. Is our support, consciously or unconsciously, going to permit Japanese rule and its stern consequences to encroach further upon China and Siberia?"

Here was the Menace. As for Japan the Exotic, Ashton-Gwatkin continued:

"The "Bushido" propaganda has done much to convince us that...the warrior's ideal is courtesy, gentleness and consideration. This impression has been supported by certain aspects of the Russo-Japanese war...but it is contradicted by all expert experience of the ways of Japanese bureaucracy at home, and still more by the record of Japanese military government abroad."²

The *Chronicle* had derided the West's fascination with bushido since 1906. Now Ashton-Gwatkin contrasted *bushido* with a *Chronicle* report that 'old men, women and children, were beaten, cut down with swords, and run through with bayonets' at Pyengyang [Heijo].³ The Exotic became, first, alien, then a Menace.

Reading 4: The Washington Conference and the ending of the Alliance

In the autumn of 1921, the *Japan Chronicle* reported *The Times* Tokyo correspondent, J. N. Penlington, reasoning that,

Japan has ardently desired to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, because during the war that pact did not seriously restrict her efforts to obtain special and exclusive privileges in China. The virtual occupation of Shantung and many of the demands presented to China in 1915 apparently were not interpreted by the British Government as being incompatible with the terms of the Alliance. The Japanese are therefore anxious to renew an agreement which has proved so elastic.

The Times supported renewal on the dubious grounds that the Alliance had maintained the integrity of China and the Open Door. Japan supported renewal, according to Penlington, because the Alliance had proved no bar to her objects in China. But as the *Chronicle* pointed out, the British Government *had* objected to Japan's pursuit of these objects, and Britain had suffered for this protest in the Japanese press in a campaign supported by the *Japan Times* itself.⁴

That winter, at the Washington Conference, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came to an end. Japan became party to a multinational treaty, and agreed, in common with the other powers, to limitations on her naval power. However, her agreement was questioned the following April, when a *Times* leader commented critically on revisions to Japanese naval policy made because 'supersession of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance compels Japan to meet future international crises single-handed'.⁵ Soon the Foreign Office News Department had organised representations to 'the representative of the "Times", who calls here every day'.⁶ Inside a week, a dithyrambic to Japan the Exotic headlined *The Mystery of Japan*, appeared, beginning, 'Today, in the midst of the spring in the Far Eastern Islands, when the cherry trees are in full blossom...'⁷

Whatever good had been achieved by these effusions was completely undone six days later by a *Daily Mail* article by Lord Northcliffe,

WATCH JAPAN! SOME SIMPLE WORDS OF WARNING

...We can hardly suppose that the Japanese have changed their plan for mastering China as the result of the Washington Conference. I venture to prophesy that they will merely alter their tactics and adapt them to the new circumstances.⁸

The article ran simultaneously in the *New York World*, *Sydney Sun*, *Melbourne Herald*, and the *Englishman*, of Calcutta, all served by the fast new United Cables service. One commentator put much of the blame for the Northcliffe campaign on Robert Young and the *Japan Chronicle*, for Northcliffe had visited Young in Kōbe in November 1921 –

...and unquestionably took away a good many of his ideas... It is improbable that ambassadorial and consular officials would have supplied him with materials for writing highly inflammatory articles about the country.