

THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA: THE AMERASIA CASE, THE 'REVERSE COURSE' IN JAPAN, MACARTHUR'S SLAP IN THE FACE (1951) & THE ANPO CRISIS OF 1960

READING 1. 'WE LOST CHINA'

IN 1949, SENIOR FIGURES IN THE PENTAGON AND THE US DEPARTMENT OF STATE TOOK



the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek by the Communist forces of Mao Tse-Tung almost personally. Chiang's retreat from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan in 1949 was accompanied by the massacre of some 10,000 native Taiwanese, but these were overlooked in the general fury that accompanied the Communist victory. Maoist China joined Stalinist Russia and forces grouped around Syngman Rhee and Ho Chi-Minh in north Korea and Vietnam as the new US bogeyman in Asia, and alliances were cemented with Chiang's Guomindang dictatorship in Taiwan, ▲ and sympathetic and sympathetic factions in ◀ Japan and Korea to create a wall of resistance to the post-war advance of Communism in East Asia.



In the US, open advocates of Communism in East Asia and elsewhere and officials who had seemed too close to the Communist Party of China were purged in the Amerasia case of 1945, or vilified in the anti-Communist trials led by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s. In Japan, the initial optimism that accompanied the democracy initially nurtured by SCAP in the person of Douglas MacArthur turned against the flood of political development it had seemed to encourage in what became known as the 'reverse course', reinforced by the more controversial provisions of the US-Japan Security Treaty / 日米安全保障条約 [Nichibei anzen hosho Joyaku] of 1951 and 1960, since automatically renewed. US bitterness over the defeat of China led to a proxy war in Korea and the division of the

nation, with the US making an increasingly uncritical investment in controversial regimes such as that of Park Chung Hee ▲.

Park was a mystery: a Korean wartime graduate of the Tokyo Military Academy who had studied in Manchoukuo. Although he had once been arrested for Communist sympathies during the Korean War, Park's formative influences were the central planning system in Manchoukuo, itself influenced both by Germany's planned economy (autarky) during the First World War, and Stalin's economic policies, which Park applied to Korea with extraordinary zeal and at great human cost. He was finally assassinated in 1960 by his intelligence chief when he advocated putting down a protest movement "even if it cost 30,000 lives".

Meanwhile, Europe had its own troubles. In March 1946, Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared that, "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent." The Cold War was World War III by other means.

READING 2. THE AMERASIA CASE

On June 6, 1945, just one month after Germany surrendered to the Allies and two months before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, six employees of *Amerasia*, a left-wing magazine devoted to Asian affairs, were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and charged with conspiring to pass US government documents to Chinese officials. FBI agents and operatives of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime predecessor of the CIA, had earlier broken into the magazine's offices in New York City where they found hundreds of official documents, many labeled "secret" and "confidential", relating to American and British policies in Asia.

Among the six arrested were Philip Jaffe and Kate Mitchell, the editors of *Amerasia*, and a rising star in the foreign service in China, John Stewart Service. Two of the six, Jaffe and Emmanuel "Jimmy" Larsen, another State Department employee, later pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of government property and received fines. All criminal charges against the others, including Service, who had worked alongside "Vinegar" Joe Stilwell and, like him, been a sharp critic of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime in China, were ultimately dropped when grand juries failed to indict.

The *Amerasia* case prompted President Truman to instigate a root and branch federal loyalty and security program which subjected thousands of executive branch employees to FBI investigations and formal hearings that probed their friendships, associations, political beliefs, and sexual habits. Many lost their jobs and good name and were charged with disloyalty to the state on the basis of confidential information that was not disclosed. Among the victims was Service, probably the best informed State Department officer regarding China's new communist rulers.

As an American Foreign Service Officer attached to General Stilwell's staff in China, one of Service's responsibilities was to brief American journalists. Occasionally he did so by showing them, as background, some of his reports. After returning from Yanan, where he had long talks with Mao Tse-tung and other CCP leaders, Service returned to the State Department in Washington, D.C., where he lent Phillip Jaffe, editor of *Amerasia*, carbon copies of some of his reports. In 1945, Service was arrested but he immediately waived immunity. He appeared as a voluntary witness before a grand jury, which questioned him, considered the evidence and unanimously dismissed his case, and Service he returned to his position in the State Department.

Some years later, during the McCarthy-McCarran period in American politics, the *Amerasia* case was revived. This time, Service was accused of a "campaign of leaking documents". The State Department's Loyalty Security Board again cleared Service but the government-wide Loyalty Review Board took over and after a brief hearing reversed the State Department's finding and ordered Service fired. Service fought the dismissal through the courts. After almost six years, the United States Supreme Court found unanimously that Service had been unjustly and illegally dismissed, and ordered his reinstatement. Service stayed on another five years in the State Department for five years, but his career as a Foreign Service Officer was over, and his special understanding of Maoism and post-war China was little used.

Esherick, Joseph W. "Looking for Spies in All the Wrong Places". In *Reviews in American History* - Volume 25, Number 1, March 1997, pp. 174-185.

The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism by Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh (Chapel Hill, 1996).

READING 3. THE 'REVERSE COURSE' IN JAPAN AND THE KOREAN WAR

The phrase "Reverse Course" has long meant the change from encouraging political pluralism and democratic exchange in post-war Japan, to the crackdown on leftist organizations and especially Communist Party of Japan (JCP) members by SCAP that came with the advent of the Cold War in East Asia. More recently, the phrase "reverse course" has been used to describe the thaw in US-China relations following the recognition by the George W. Bush administration after the September 11 2001 attacks that the greatest threat faced by the US was global terrorism and that this overrode any threat posed by China in East Asia.*

However, the term Reverse Course still describes the change in US policy toward Japan linked to the Cold War, the "loss" of China to Communism and the outbreak of war in Korea. With the Reverse Course, policies such as the break-up of the zaibatsu and the purging of rightist elements, even classified war criminals, halted in order to create a strong Japanese economy as a bulwark against Communism.

In 1949, a triumphant MacArthur declared that "...the Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defense runs through the chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia. It starts in the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu archipelago which includes its broad bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska...". This was the "Pax Americana" which is still with us today. MacArthur accompanied this strategic rethink with the idea that the post-war reforms in Japan had 'gone too far' and that Occupation Policy now had to prioritize East Asian (and US) Security over Democratization.

The Reverse Course was accompanied by a return to the central economic planning that had characterised the administration of Manchoukuo and economic planning in the Japanese empire during the Fifteen Year War (1931-1945), with preferential funding, loans and tax breaks to key industries, reconsolidation of the zaibatsu, alliances with right-wing forces and yakuza to break leftist-inspired strikes and other movements, and an end to reparation payments and war-related purges. Japanese Communists in the mass media were particularly subject to the 'red purges' instigated by SCAP, while the return of Kishi Nobusuke to political life heralded the de-purging of a number of high-profile but avowedly anti-Communist wartime military, business and political leaders to draw on their authority and expertise.

The outbreak of the Korean War was seen by some as a 'gift of the gods' as the tokujū (special procurements) required to run the war propelled Japan's phoenix-like return to prosperity and the bright new era (akarui seikatsu) of the 1950s-late 1980s. However, these were achieved at considerable cost to Japan's independence in the public sphere. Contrary or 'difficult' voices and opinions that might have enabled a true pluralism were suppressed, and the press neutralised in what has often been seen as an unhealthy cooperative alliance of the Fourth Estate and the government typified by what is known as the "Kisha Club" system operating at most government ministries.

*This view has since been diluted but see for example, Swaine, Michael (2003) "Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China Relations" in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, online (as pdf) at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybrief22.pdf>

READING 4. THE END OF THE AFFAIR: A SLAP IN THE FACE FROM MACARTHUR (1951)

On June 25 1950, North Korean forces moved across the 38th parallel separating North and South Korea. The United States viewed this as a transformation of the Cold War into a “warm war” and announced that it would respond by defending South Korea. Despite this commitment, SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers / 連合国最高司令官 [Rengokoku saiko shireikan]), otherwise known as General Douglas MacArthur, wanted to go even further. MacArthur first urged Japan’s Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru [吉田茂 1878-1967] to create a standing army of 350,000 men. Knowing that Japanese rearmament on this scale would cause enormous problems for both US and Japanese credibility in Asia and provoke further domestic unrest, Yoshida played for time and avoided expansion. Frustrated, MacArthur then went even further, urging Washington towards declaring all-out war against China.

On April 11 1951, US President Truman dismissed MacArthur as both SCAP and as Commander of UN forces in Korea, for ‘insubordination’. On April 16 1951 MacArthur was given a hero’s farewell from Japan, which was carried live on NHK. School children were excused classes, with 200,000 lining the streets, waving American flags. The Emperor went to General MacArthur’s residence to say goodbye. There were plans for a memorial. On April 17 1951 MacArthur returned to a hero’s welcome in the US, where in a mawkish, oft-quoted speech he told Congress that “Old soldiers never die, they just fade away”

APRIL 22 1951 In a Senate interview, MacArthur was asked if the Japanese could be depended on to defend their new freedoms. Could the Japanese be trusted more than the Germans? Here is MacArthur’s reply: “Well, the German problem is a completely and entirely different one from the Japanese problem. The German people were a mature race.

If the Anglo-Saxon was, say, 45 years of age in his development, in the sciences, the arts, divinity, culture, the Germans were quite as mature. The Japanese, however, in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in very tuitionary condition. Measured by the standards of modern civilisation, they would be **like a boy of twelve** as compared with our development of 45 years.

Like any tuitionary period, they were susceptible to following new models, new ideas. You can implant basic concepts there. They were still close enough to origin to be elastic and acceptable to new concepts.

The German was quite as mature as we were. Whatever the German did in dereliction of the standards of modern morality, the international standards, he did it deliberately. He didn’t do it because of a lack of knowledge of the world. He didn’t do it because he stumbled into it to some extent as the Japanese did. He did it as a considered policy in which he believed in his own military might, in which he believed that its application would be a shortcut to the power and economic domination that he desired....

But the Japanese were entirely different. There is no similarity. One of the great mistakes that was made was to try to apply the same policies which were so successful in Japan to Germany, where they were not quite so successful, to say the least. They were working on a different level.”

READING 5. “ I LIKE A BOY OF TWELVE...”

FOR MANY IN JAPAN, MacArthur’s words came as a terrible slap in the face. People realized to their shame how they had snuggled up MacArthur and many regretted their friendly feelings towards SCAP and the Occupation. From this point on, MacArthur’s name began to be purged from memory. Plans for a MacArthur memorial were abandoned. No MacArthur statue was ever built and MacArthur never became an honorary citizen.



“Goodbye, MacArthur” didn’t mean “Goodbye, America.”

“ **MACARTHUR’S CHILDREN**”: In the post-war reform era, many post-war Japanese had described themselves as “MacArthur’s children” - and now he called them children. Japan’s new Self-Defence Force was “America’s Army”. The new economy was entirely dependent on American indulgence and support. The weakness of Japan was never more naked or evident. The inequality of the relationship was there to see.

28 APRIL 1952: This inequality was formalised in the San Francisco Peace Treaty サンフランシスコ講和条約 [San Furanshishuko Kowa Joyaku]. When Japan signed up to “Pax Americana”. The price was high and ushered in the chain of consequences that hardened into the Cold War in East Asia: rearmament under the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ meant continued US bases on Japanese soil; Okinawa remained American; the Soviet Union did not sign the


Treaty and continued to claim the disputed islands near Hokkaido; China refused to sign the Treaty because it locked Japan into the US sphere of power; the US Senate refused to sign the treaty unless the US made a separate treaty with Taiwan; the US-Taiwan treaty meant Japan lost the China market

Many felt that, in effect, with the Treaty, Japan became “free, but not free”. Japan was free to become the world’s second largest economy, but not free politically or in terms of foreign policy. They argued that even during its most prosperous years, Japan’s greatest freedom was limited to economic success. For these critics of the US-Japan relationship, Japan became the rich kid of East Asia, extended a generous allowance by Uncle Sam, but not really allowed to grow up.

Thus, opponents of the uneasy post-war trade-off between democracy and security felt that although Japan achieved an extraordinary transition from the *Menace* of East Asia to the Post-War *Phoenix* [戦後不死鳥], politically, this Phoenix was not encouraged to fly. Made in Japan’ [日本製] may well have become a mark of quality and reliability the world over, but Bought in Japan’ let alone Made in Japan’ did not seem to be part of the deal.




沖縄と関東周辺に集中する米軍施設



BY THE LATE 1950s, many in Japan wished to rewrite the Treaty despite strong support from Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, a depurged class “A” war criminal whose strong anti-communist credentials appealed to the US as oppositions hardened in the emerging Cold War. During Treaty negotiations held under the Kishi Nobusuke premiership, the Left

organised nationwide protests. Japan's signing of the revised treaty in January 1960 set off a political crisis and a leftist campaign against its ratification in the Diet. The revised Treaty removed the clause allowing US troops to intervene in internal disturbances in Japan, but the treaty still made Japan the main US satellite in East Asia and placed China in the position of 'enemy'. The "anti-Security Treaty" movement, which had begun in the late 1950s, developed into a nationwide mass movement to protest both the Treaty and the evident contradiction between the Kishi cabinet's willingness to sign it and the new, post-war democratic spirit touted by SCAP.



On May 20, about 100,000 members of the National Federation of Students and the National Federation of Labor, surrounded prime minister Kishi's official residence. On the 23rd, a barbed wire fence was put up to defend the residence from increasingly fierce demonstrations. On May 24th, representatives of the Social Democratic Party, went to the American Embassy to demand that "a telegraph requesting the postponement of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan be sent to the United States." On May 26th, the National Assembly for Stopping the Security Treaty Revisions organized another demonstration, with 170,000 demonstrators encircling the National Diet.

In early June, the pending visit of US President Eisenhower renewed protests. On June 10, Eisenhower's press secretary barely escaped by helicopter ▲ from a mob of students at Haneda

airport. On June 4, about 5.6 million people participated in an anti-treaty strike, led chiefly by the railway unions (with 2,200 trains were out of service that day).

The Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate approved the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America on the 14th. On the 15th, in a last push to prevent the ratification of the revised Security Treaty, approximately 5.8 million people joined protests and strikes throughout Japan.

On June 18, demonstrators from the National Federation of Students stormed the Diet and fought security personnel and some right-wing demonstrators. In the melée that followed, a young University of Tokyo student, Kanba Michiko [樺美智子], died from suffocation and around 182 demonstrators were arrested, about 100 of them badly injured. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the US was approved at twelve o'clock in the morning of June 19 1960 without the resolution of the House of Councilors.

QUESTIONNAIRE	HISTORY OF JOURNALISTIC DISCOURSE	WEEK No. 9
NAME	STUDENT No.	DATE
1. WHAT WAS THIS CLASS ABOUT?		
2. WHAT ARE THE MAIN QUESTIONS IT RAISES?		
3. WHAT IS IMPORTANT ABOUT THIS SUBJECT?		

4. ANY OTHER COMMENTS?